Significant segments of the American left and right agreed on the broad outlines of economic policy. (AP) Summary The new consensus has three principles: tackle concentration of economic power, restore dignity through good jobs and let the state actively shape the economy through industrial policy. In Washington, Trump appears to be going along with this bipartisan consensus, but he is not. The post-neoliberal consensus is here, but don’t look for it in US President Donald Trump’s policies. After a decade of backlash, it is time to accept not only that neoliberalism is dead, but also that a new consensus is taking its place. Remarkably, significant segments of the American left and right have agreed on the broad outlines of economic policy. Conversations in universities and think tanks today are driven by a common understanding that deviates significantly from the neoliberal orthodoxy of the past 50 years. The first element of the new consensus is a recognition that the concentration of economic power has become excessive. The concern is expressed in different forms by different groups. Some directly complain about inequality in income and wealth and its corrosive effects on politics. Others are concerned about market power and the adverse implications for competition. For still others, the key problem is financialization and the distortion of economic and social priorities it causes. The remedies on offer also vary, from wealth taxes to vigorous antitrust enforcement to campaign finance reform. But the desire to combat the economic and political power of corporate, tech and financial elites is widespread, uniting progressive supporters of US Senator Bernie Sanders with populists such as podcast host and former Trump adviser Steve Bannon. The second element of the new consensus is the importance of restoring dignity to people and regions left behind by neoliberalism. Good works are essential to this agenda. Work is not just a means of providing income. They are also a source of identity and social recognition. Good jobs are the foundation of a robust middle class, which is the foundation of social cohesion and a sustainable democracy. Disruption is inevitable in a world of economic change. Until the 1990s, many safeguards—job protection, trade restrictions, price controls, and regulations that reined in finance—limited the impact on workers and communities. For neoliberals, these safeguards were inefficiencies that needed to be removed. They overlooked the economic and social distress that job losses due to technological change, globalization or economic liberalization would cause. The third component of the emerging consensus is that government has an active role to play in shaping the economic transformation that is needed. Markets on their own cannot be trusted to produce economic resilience, national security, innovation for advanced technologies, clean energy or good jobs in distressed regions. The government must encourage, twist arms and subsidize. Industrial policy has moved from the fringes of economic discussion to its center. Taken together, these three principles provide a new understanding of the goals and instruments of economic policy that is both novel and, on the whole, commendable. But the devil is always in the details. Actual outcomes will be determined by specific policies chosen and implemented. Consider the good job goal. Here, left and right seem to have reached a consensus on the desirability of relocation and revival of manufacturing. Historically, the industrial workforce played a crucial role in the production of equitable middle-class societies. But automation and other technological forces have transformed manufacturing into a labor-losing sector. Even China has lost manufacturing jobs by the millions in recent years. So, even if manufacturing investment and production is revived in the US and Europe, the impact on employment is likely to be small. Like it or not, the future of employment lies in services—care, retail, hospitality, logistics, the gig economy and so on. Any approach to good jobs that does not focus on organizational and technological innovations in these services will inevitably disappoint. There are, of course, other important reasons for supporting manufacturing. Advanced manufacturing, along with the digital economy, plays a major role in innovation and national security. It makes sense to deploy industrial policies that focus on these economic activities, in addition to policies that focus on labor-absorbing services. But here too the ‘how’ matters as much as the ‘what’. Caveats also apply to industrial policies. It can go badly wrong when they promote corruption or serve narrow corporate interests. Unfortunately, Trump’s approach offers little comfort on this point. The US president’s trade policies and dealings with technology companies have been erratic, transactional and without a coherent long-term strategy that would serve the public interest. The post-neoliberal principles of economic policy provide us with a broad checklist for evaluating real agendas—and Trump’s fails miserably. It pays lip service to good jobs and industrial policy in the service of economic transformation, while promoting greater concentration of wealth and power. A model of welfare state capitalism that attempts to revive a long-dead industrial economy is hardly an antidote to neoliberalism. The best that can be said about Trump’s approach to the economy is that it is an experimental phase in the post-neoliberal transition. The good news is that future policymakers don’t have to look far for new guidelines. The new consensus is already here. ©2025/Project Syndicate The author is a professor of international political economy at the Harvard Kennedy School, and the author of ‘Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy’.